



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

DJURVIS BROWN,  
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Respondent.

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3:16-CV-1793-M  
3:12-CR-0273-M

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:

**I. Procedural Background**

Petitioner filed this petition to vacate, set-aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. He did not file an appeal.

On June 24, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 petition, and June 29, 2016, the Court received an amended petition. Petitioner seeks relief under the Supreme Court's decision in *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

On August 19, 2017, the government filed its answer arguing, *inter alia*, that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner did not file a reply. The Court now finds the petition should be dismissed as time-barred.

## **II. Discussion**

### **1. Statute of Limitations**

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas proceedings. *See* ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) ("AEDPA"). The statute provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of:

- (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
- (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the Petitioner was prevented from filing by such governmental action;
- (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
- (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

*See* 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

In most cases, the limitations period begins to run when the judgment becomes final. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Petitioner's conviction became final on February 19, 2013, when the time for filing an appeal expired. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (providing fourteen days to file an appeal in criminal cases) (West 2013). Petitioner then had one year, or until February 19, 2014, to file his § 2255 petition. Petitioner did not file his petition until June 24, 2016.

Here, Petitioner relies on *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), to argue his petition is timely under § 2255(f)(3). This section states the limitations period runs from the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. In *Johnson*, the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) found at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner’s sentence, however, was not increased under the ACCA’s residual clause—the only provision that *Johnson* found to be unconstitutional. See *Johnson*, 135 S. Ct. at 2563 (calling into question only the residual clause of the ACCA). *Johnson*, therefore does not apply to his case.

Further, to the extent Petitioner claims that *Johnson* invalidated his enhancements under the sentencing guidelines, his claim is without merit. Under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Beckles v. United States*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 137 S.Ct. 886, 892 (2017), the Court held that the sentencing guidelines are not subject to a challenge for vagueness. The Court stated:

Unlike the ACCA, however, the advisory Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences. To the contrary, they merely guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range. Accordingly, the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. The residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) therefore is not void for vagueness.

*Id.* Petitioner’s claims under *Johnson* are therefore without merit.

## **2. Equitable Tolling**

The one-year limitation period is subject to equitable tolling in “rare and exceptional

cases.” *Davis v. Johnson*, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998); *see also Fisher v. Johnson*, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.1999) (asserting that courts must "examine each case on its facts to determine whether it presents sufficiently 'rare and exceptional circumstances' to justify equitable tolling" (quoting *Davis*, 158 F.3d at 811)). The Fifth Circuit has held that " '[e]quitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.' " *Coleman v. Johnson*, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting *Rashidi v. Am. President Lines*, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1996)). Movant bears the burden of proof to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. *Phillips v. Donnelly*, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

Petitioner has failed to show he was actively misled about his habeas remedies or that he was prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights. He has failed to show rare and exceptional circumstances justifying equitable tolling in this case.

### **III. Recommendation**

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the petition to vacate, set-aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 be dismissed.

Signed this 4 day of October, 2017.

  
PAUL D. STICKNEY  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).